Central Asia has successfully garnered the interest of U.S. President Donald Trump, and the White House has announced its intent to host a C5+1 Summit on November 6. Formed in 2015, the annual, high-level diplomatic meeting is the primary platform for U.S.-Central Asia cooperation in a region that has historically engaged with its northern and eastern neighbors—Russia and China. With stated interest from both sides to develop critical minerals partnerships, this industry has become an expected priority on the Summit agenda. That said, the C5+1 has historically worked to tackle a broad range of issues of regional importance, providing a reliable outlet to dialogue without Russia and China. At its 10-year anniversary, the C5+1 has come a long way from its conception, and though new aims top the agenda over time, many of the same goals still remain at the platform’s core.

Background of the C5+1

The C5+1 brings together the United States and all five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Its formation came against the backdrop of heightened regional intrigue and notable geopolitical events. In 2013, China launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), indicating Beijing’s mission to secure energy supplies and invest in infrastructure development across the Global South. At China’s back door, Central Asia became a natural hotspot for economic partnerships. To the north, the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 alarmed the Greater Caspian Region. With the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War, Moscow tarnished its reputation and demonstrated the potential dangers of a growing imperial stance. 

Meanwhile, the U.S. War on Terror in Afghanistan began to slow, and Washington sought to address the nearby risks of radicalization. The United States also utilized Central Asian airports and bases during the war, which helped develop U.S.-Central Asia security cooperation. In the mid-2010s, Central Asian states experienced a slowdown in growth due to stagnant oil output,  falling oil prices, rising inflation, and economic uncertainty from Russia, China, and Türkiye. Considering such geopolitical and internal conditions, the development of the C5+1 came at an opportune time. 

On the sidelines of the 2015 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York, former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with the foreign ministers of all five Central Asian states, marking a new chapter in U.S.-Central Asia cooperation. Shortly after, Secretary Kerry went on to conduct a comprehensive visit to all five states in the region. On November 1, 2015, Kerry once again met with the Central Asian foreign ministers, and this gathering in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, marked the first ever C5+1 Ministerial meeting.

To navigate between the interests of Russia and China has been a gradual and careful process for the Central Asian states. Over the years, officials at the ministerial level have conducted visits to their respective counterparts, holding high-level meetings of varying personnel and topics. Cooperation largely centered around dialogue and shared goals. However, under the Biden Administration, the C5+1 began to consider transforming into an active organization. In 2022, the C5+1 formed a Secretariat to address shared priorities and improve meeting coordination. On the sidelines of UNGA 2023, the first ever C5+1 presidential summit took place, after which the leaders announced the New York Declaration—a joint document expressing the commitment of each member to further cooperation and maintain resilience. Thus, the 2025 summit will mark the second heads of state summit among the platform’s leaders.

The C5+1’s Pillars and Broadening Agenda

The C5+1 consists of working groups for three primary pillars: economy, energy, and security. On the economic front the platform aims to develop balanced economic relations, increase trade volume, and identify efforts for further investment and partnerships in tandem with Central Asian businesses. The Business5/B5+1 Forum, which was established in 2023 and first held in 2024, aims to improve public-private partnerships. It offers a space to discuss potential investment avenues for both U.S. and Central Asian businesses. 

Importantly, the U.S. has yet to repeal the Jackson-Vanik Amendment—a Cold War legacy that prevented the establishment of permanent normal trade relations with Soviet republics because of Moscow’s emigration restrictions at that time for Soviet Jews. At present, it still applies to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan but focuses on mostly on human rights. Kazakh, Tajik, and Uzbek officials have openly expressed interest in heightening bilateral and C5+1 cooperation with the U.S. through the revocation of Jackson-Vanik.

About the second pillar, the C5+1 strives to enhance Central Asia’s energy security and connectivity. The United States prioritizes the development of the Middle Corridor to facilitate westward trade, reducing the region’s dependence on Russia and China. For instance, the G7’s flagship investment effort, known as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), has pledged up to $200 billion by 2027 into Central Asia, including $600 million for Kazakhstan’s rail development. 

Along with energy security, the United States. has also included greater sustainability of Central Asia’s green economy. Most notably, the energy pillar includes identifying avenues that tap into the region’s strategic mineral deposits; and with increasing demand worldwide for these materials, mining has become a top priority for greenfield and brownfield investment. The inaugural C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue was held in 2024, signaling U.S. intent to expand its footprint in the minerals sector and counter China’s stranglehold on its supply chains.

As already mentioned, efforts to bolster security cooperation have served to enhance U.S.-Central Asia relations before and since the C5+1’s inception. The bulk of U.S. regional security efforts has centered around counterterrorism, as the threat of violent extremism stems from the proximity of groups like ISIS-K. Illicit trafficking is a common occurrence in the Greater Caspian Region, and enhanced border security follows as another stated priority. Moreover, the C5+1 security pillar includes promoting stability in Afghanistan and ensuring that women and ethnic minorities are protected within its borders. 

Across the pillars, other themes frequently appear on the agenda. For instance, water security remains a pressing issue in Central Asia due to glacial melt. Induced by climate change, freshwater scarcity threatens both the energy and food security of the region’s inhabitants. Likewise, Central Asian leaders have expressed their ambitions to develop artificial intelligence capabilities, as a means to modernize along the Middle Corridor and build opportunities for technological investment. In the cultural sphere, the C5+1 has worked to strengthen “people to people ties,” facilitating historical preservation, offering academic exchanges, and creating cultural programs.

Although dialogue has been strong, backing efforts with concrete action and funding remains a challenge. Deployment of capital remains to be seen based only on verbal agreements and pledges. Nevertheless, attention towards Central Asia has definitely grown, and the agenda of the C5+1 clearly envelops several new prevalent issues, suitable for increased U.S. activity. 

Growing International Interest in Central Asia

Around the time that Secretary Kerry visited Central Asia for the first C5+1 summit, other states had also begun to identify avenues for further engagement with Central Asian states. In 2015, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the C5 states, as part of the Central Asia plus Japan dialogue which has been a regular occurrence since 2005. Other states now view the creation of C5+ minilaterals as conducive to engaging with Central Asia. Russia hosted its first Russia-Central Asia Summit in 2022, with China hosting its first China-Central Asia Summit in Xi’an in 2023. More recently, Uzbekistan hosted the first EU-Central Asia Summit in April, 2025, and South Korea looks to launch an inaugural summit with the C5 in 2026. 

The C5 grouping of states has come to transform the way that the region conducts directed diplomacy with select partners. This year, the C5+1 can bolster U.S.-Central Asia relations, because U.S. demand for critical minerals grows and also because Central Asia looks to diversify the region’s economic partnerships away from dominance by Russia and China. In this vein, Washington will likely seek to capitalize on the opportune time of the White House Summit to ensure that it can wield economic tools and policy plans to turn dialogue into action. If it continues to increase its attention to the region, the United States could empower its version of C5+1 gatherings to rise above the rest of the region’s minilaterals to construct a more sustainable and long-term partnership for mutual benefit.