The UK government announced on 13 October that it was lifting its arms embargo on Azerbaijan and Armenia (in place since a 1992 OSCE decision) following the initialling of a peace agreement at a summit in Washington on 8 August and the subsequent dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group.

The question is whether this is simply a technical measure to support commercial aims, or heralds greater British involvement in the region. Similarly, does the announcement of Strategic Partnerships with Azerbaijan and Armenia amount to something of substance?

Certainly, the August summit in Washington - and an announcement on 23 September of a deal for Kazakhstan to buy $4.2 billion worth of US locomotives and rail equipment - confirmed the US Administration’s re-engagement with the region. So the door is open again for a greater Western role, both political and commercial.

Along with my CPC colleague David Moran, I recently attended the inaugural UK-Azerbaijan policy forum in Baku - bringing together participants from government, parliament, business, academia and civil society - which discussed developing greater UK engagement, initially with Azerbaijan.

Source: Institute for Development and Diplomacy 

Traditionally, the UK-Azerbaijan bilateral relationship has rested on three main pillars - government cooperation, energy (with BP the dominant international player in Azerbaijan) and education. 

Clearly, the energy component of the relationship has changed in recent years after the UK government - in the run-up to hosting COP26 in Glasgow - ruled out future support for oil and gas investment overseas (also affecting Shell in Kazakhstan). But at least we caught the zeitgeist of a shift towards green energy, and British experience with offshore wind (for many years the UK was the largest producer of offshore wind energy globally) has been a valuable asset in Azerbaijan in particular. As an aside, one can surmise that all our lobbying and awareness raising over COP26 might - even if subconsciously - have inspired Azerbaijan to bid to host COP29.

UK relations with the other countries of the Caspian region have varied, depending on the specifics of each country. Georgia was for long at the top of the list for attention and resources, with the focus on supporting the transition into Western structures. For obvious reasons, there has been a strong commercial and economic reform component to the UK’s relationship with Kazakhstan, while support for economic and political development has been a key element of the relationships with Armenia and the remaining Central Asian states. And while the British government has been very supportive of Georgia in tackling Russian occupation of the breakaway regions, it was - not being a member of the Minsk Group - always studiously neutral on the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict.

But the above alludes to the reality that the British Foreign Office is more comfortable with standard bilateral engagement, and less so with strategic thinking or designing regional approaches. So, for example, instead of the C5+1 engagement framework with Central Asian states that other countries have utilised, the last Foreign Secretary to visit the region (in 2024) effectively held five C1+1 meetings. And the Foreign Office has not sought to promote regional integration in the South Caucasus.

But the Greater Caspian region has changed significantly in recent years: the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process, democratic backsliding in Georgia, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the advent of the Middle Corridor, rising interest in critical minerals, the focus on green energy, climate change, and the role of China and Turkey all have profound implications for the countries of the region. 

And the world more generally has changed. The trend to a multipolar world means smaller countries now have more choices, or more “agency”. Threats - or the imposition - of sanctions (eg in the case of Georgia) can simply alienate and lead to a loss of influence. So Western countries - including the UK - need to recalibrate their policies to find a more strategic balance if they want to retain influence and protect their interests.

The Middle Corridor - initially regarded simply as a Russia-bypass transport route between China and Europe, but increasingly as a broader framework to support economic development - by definition demands a regional approach, whether that be the railway, or green energy exports to Europe, or digital connectivity. All of these cut across borders and seas. 

Equally, the impact of climate change in the region - rising temperatures, melting glaciers, less rainfall - knows no borders, with impacts that demand regional cooperation. Tensions between upstream and downstream states, and the balance between water for irrigation and power generation have huge economic and security implications.

Even more strategically, I’ve written previously about the re-emergence of the concept of Eurasia, and the Heartland Theory first put forward at the beginning of the last century, which argues that whoever controls Eurasia will control the world. The UK - and the West - are clearly not looking to control the Greater Caspian region; the issue is more how to ensure the countries have options, how they - and their populations - can have openings to the West, instead of being dominated by autocratic external powers looking to expand their influence. 

So there are many reasons for the UK to take on a more proactive, more strategic role in the region. What might this look like?

In terms of format, the UK should engage with Central Asian states on a regional basis (C5+1 format) in addition to bilateral engagement. And - in the case of the connectivity issues - they should probably include at least Azerbaijan on the western side of the Caspian, given Baku’s status of being the only node on the Middle Corridor through which all transport routes pass.

In the South Caucasus, the Azerbaijani-Armenia deal now opens up space for promoting practical regional cooperation on transport, infrastructure, tourism, and trade. All three countries are relatively small and isolated by global standards, and regional cooperation is surely a requirement for their long-term development and success. After the 2020 Azerbaijan-Armenia war, in which Azerbaijan reclaimed much of its occupied territory, Turkey initiated a 3+3 cooperation framework, to include the three South Caucasus nations plus the neighbouring states of Turkey, Russia and Iran. Its utility is doubtful, given Georgian non-participation and the suspicions that exist between other participants. 

Now there is an opportunity for a new 3+3 format, to include the US, EU and UK. The US has signalled its intention to play a continuing role, not least through the TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) linking Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan via Armenia. The EU’s Eastern Partnership programme and Global Gateway are tailor-made for promoting regional connectivity and collaboration. And the UK brings the financial clout of the City of London, a strong services sector, green energy experience, and high end manufacturing. It also brings a close relationship with Turkey, a country which has a strong and growing regional influence. As for the politics, yes, the Western political relationship with Georgia is in a bad place; but involving Georgia in regional economic initiatives offers a less politically-charged way to engage the government in a positive way that incentivises cooperation. 

Another big asset the UK possesses is the English language and higher education. People often refer to these as part of the UK’s “soft power”. Maybe this is the correct term in some parts of the world, but in the Greater Caspian region these are strategic assets. Language, education and culture are the battlegrounds on which Russia - when it is not invading these countries - fights for influence in the former Soviet states. The UK - and the US and EU - should be combatting Russia in these areas. Language and education are about how you see yourself, where you look for information, who you talk to, where you visit, indeed, how you think. 

To give an example of the UK’s power in the area of education, we heard at the policy forum in Baku that around 70% of students with an Azerbaijani state scholarship are choosing to study in the UK, well above the Azerbaijani government’s expectation that the figure would be 30%. That’s hundreds of talented young people each year being both educated and influenced in the UK. Equally, the UK is extremely popular with young Kazakhs with a Bolashak scholarship. Maintaining a relationship with these young people - both in the UK and when they return - has to be a priority, not solely for British Embassies or the British Council, but also for the British Chamber of Commerce in the regional countries, bringing together different legs of the UK relationship in countries like Azerbaijan. 

Additionally, several UK universities - most recently Cardiff - have established a presence in Kazakhstan, and Warwick University are running a dual degree programme on renewable energy in Baku. That is excellent. But there is scope for a more proactive approach. An Azerbaijan-Italy University has just opened in Baku, a consortium of five Italian universities offering a range of dual degree programmes. That’s the sort of thing the UK should be looking to pull together, whether in individual countries or - even better - looking to establish regional centres of excellence. 

 

The UK system - with clear divisions between government, business and academia - can struggle to pull these things together. And likely forthcoming cuts to the Foreign Office, the British Council and the overseas commercial effort (due to the government’s need to reduce its budget deficit) will impede the government’s ability to develop an effective regional policy. The UK - like other European countries - has pledged to increase its defence budget in response to Russian threats to European security and rising global insecurity. But defence and security are a continuum. Focusing purely on hard defence while cutting opportunities for conflict prevention and long term influence feels like a strategic error. The foreign policy bang for the education buck is significant, and the UK should be funding this more, not less. It also pays commercial dividends.

 

There is not space to mention all the other opportunities for the UK to play a role in the region - ranging from cyber security and digital connectivity, to promoting green energy, to defence and space - but they are all areas where the UK can work with key partners to consolidate Western influence in the region and ensure the countries at least have an opening to the West and are working collectively with each other. They are, of course, also areas which need a joined up approach, as does, for example, the search for supplies of critical minerals, with the necessary interplay between mining, finance and infrastructure.

 

But how to do this and do so consistently - the perpetual problem Western governments face? The UK will never be able to match the Russian level of engagement, but occasional visits by Ministers, who then get reshuffled, is no way to develop and maintain relationships in a region in which personal connections are key. All Ambassadors worldwide like the idea of Prime Minister’s Personal/Special Envoys, and all Foreign Ministry HQs sigh when this is mentioned. But the UK system of Trade Envoys is valuable (the current one for the region covers exactly the Central Asian 5 plus Azerbaijan), and they can get access. So it makes sense to look again at the question of a parallel role on the policy side. Similarly, an Education Envoy to pull together - both in the UK and overseas - higher education cooperation and English language teaching.

 

These are just some ideas of where UK strengths lie. The main point is that all the changes in recent months and years have altered the landscape significantly, not simply offering new opportunities for the UK, but also requiring a different way of working - more strategic, more joined up, more regional. Recent announcements on Strategic Partnerships and the lifting of an arms embargo are welcome steps; now it’s time for the British government to recalibrate and reinforce its approach to the Greater Caspian region.