Ukrainian drones struck the Ryazan oil refinery as well as an oil depot in occupied Luhansk on September 5, in the latest strike from Kyiv’s months-long campaign against Russia’s critical energy infrastructure. Ukraine is especially targeting refineries and the export logistics that move fuel to market. Over the summer, strikes and follow-on outages sidelined more than 17 percent of Russia’s refining capacity.

For Central Asia, these ripple effects are now becoming increasingly regular rather than isolated shocks. Wholesale prices spiked upward 50.2 percent between January and August, translating into significant retail price shocks for import-dependent markets. Transit risk compounds this price instability. Kazakhstan’s reliance on pumping oil through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) route means that each time Russia closes a mooring or suspends a berth on the pipeline immediately affects export volumes and timing. On the policy side, while exemptions under the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) or bilateral supply deals protect fuel import volumes for now, Central Asia still depends on Russia’s unpredictable policy swings. Over-reliance on Russian products and routes leaves the region’s markets exposed to volatility and to policy discretion they do not, and cannot, control.

Yet, these same pressures could also open a window of opportunity. Central Asian countries are increasingly looking to reduce dependence on Russia, expand domestic refining capacity, and strengthen efforts to position the region as an alternative supplier and the Middle Corridor as a transit route.

Russian Fuels and Risks for Central Asia

Ukraine’s recent strikes hit multiple elements of Russia’s fuel supply system. The Ryazan refinery was already at 50 percent capacity following the August 2 attack; the damage from the second hit on September 5 has yet to be determined. Ust-Luga is running at roughly half its usual output, after upstream pipeline damage. Refineries at Volgograd, Saratov, Novokuibyshevsk, Syzran, and the Krasnodar cluster (Ilsky, Afipsky, Slavyansk, Krasnodar) also experienced July–August disruptions, ranging from halted crude intake to site-specific outages and fires. On the pipeline side, the Druzhba pipeline’s Unecha pumping station was struck in August, interrupting flows to Hungary and Slovakia before partial restarts. 

Ukraine’s recent hydrocarbon infrastructure attacks pick up on a series of successful drone incursions from earlier in the year. In February, Ukrainian drones struck the CPC’s Kropotkinskaya pumping station in Krasnodar Krai, briefly reducing flows. The stakes for Kazakhstan are especially high: the CPC route carries about 80 percent of Kazakh crude exports, equivalent to nearly six percent of GDP and roughly one-quarter of state budget revenues. CPC said it rerouted barrels to bypass the damaged station and that marine loadings at the Black Sea terminal continued, but Russia’s transport watchdog, Rostransnadzor, then closed two of the terminal’s three single-point moorings for “snap” inspections, and Transneft suspended a separate Novorossiisk oil berth leaving only one CPC mooring in service and tightening loading slots. Kazakhstan and Chevron said exports were not interrupted, though officials in Moscow spoke of a temporary throughput cut of up to 30-40 percent while repairs were underway. Restoration work at Kropotkinskaya was completed by late April, and CPC relaunched the station on May 23. 

Faced with its own supply shortages and rising prices, Moscow imposed a gasoline export ban for August and September. In October, limited exports will be allowed, with officials signaling they could tighten again if Russia’s domestic market strains further. 

The impact of the ban on Central Asia has been uneven. As EAEU members, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan keep receiving gasoline and refined fuels under their intergovernmental agreements; Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, though not in the EAEU, are exempted from Russia’s gasoline export bans by intergovernmental fuel-supply agreements.  So far, contracted volumes have continued under those channels, although these carve-outs don’t eliminate vulnerability to Russia’s quickly changing exports rules.

While volumes might be partially protected by EAEU and bilateral exemptions, Central Asia’s exposure to fuel price volatility remains high. When Russian plants cycled offline earlier this year, wholesale gasoline prices spiked 50.2 percent that then filtered down to retail prices. Central Asia’s exposure to Russian supply and price shocks reinforces the case for regional self-sufficiency. At the same time, geopolitical pressures also impact external fuel demand, creating a parallel incentive for Central Asian producers to fill Russia’s market gaps and to rise as an alternative supplier. 

Shifting Incentives

Global demand is working in Central Asia’s favor. The European Union (EU) has embargoed Russian seaborne crude for nearly two years and LPG imports since December 19, 2024. These prohibitions have squeezed Russian supplies out of Europe and opened space for alternatives: Russian-sourced LPG via Orenburg was replaced when buyers pivoted to LPG from Kazakhstan. Similarly, Kazakhstan became the EU’s third-largest supplier of crude in 2024, after the United States and Norway. 

To curb Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil, the Trump administration imposed an extra 25 percent tariff on India on August 6, with officials signaling a possible extension of secondary tariffs to other large buyers in order to further choke Russian revenues. Against this backdrop, Central Asian fuels and alternative transit routes such as the Middle Corridor look increasingly attractive as lower-risk substitutes, while Russia cycles through outages and policy shifts.

Current Capacity 

Central Asia's refining capacity and fuel dependence vary significantly, showing both resilience and vulnerability to Russian influence. Kazakhstan is the most self-sufficient in the region, though its CPC export dependence is vulnerable to disruptions and price shocks. Uzbekistan relies on supply guarantees from Russia, with private importers facing tighter access and rising costs despite new production capacity. Turkmenistan stands apart with its own refineries and heavy fuel subsidies that insulate domestic consumers, though at significant fiscal cost. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are almost totally dependent on Russian fuel and LPG imports, with markets highly sensitive to price volatility and supply disruptions.

Growth Mindset

Central Asia’s refining footprint is small compared to Russia’s but is steadily expanding. Governments are already investing to cut dependence on Russian fuels and to position themselves as reliable suppliers to Europe and Türkiye.

Kazakhstan aims to move from covering domestic needs to exporting 30 percent of its output by 2040, with near-term steps focused on squeezing more from existing units and upgrading quality to EU/Türkiye specifications. Uzbekistan has made visible strides: its new gas-to-liquid (GTL) plant and Fergana modernization now supply Jet A-1 fuel, while the Bukhara upgrade promises Euro-5 fuels by 2025. Turkmenistan’s Turkmenbashi and Seydi refineries, supported by a new Japanese-Turkish gas-to-gasoline project, already cover domestic demand and provide a platform for exports. Tajikistan’s Dangara plant, if launched in 2025, would be Dushanbe’s first real hedge against full import dependence. Kyrgyzstan remains the most exposed with 93 percent motor fuels imported from Russia, but projects at Jalal-Abad and Kara-Balta show intent to build a modest domestic cushion. On transit routes, Kazakh crude volumes shipped via the Caspian to Baku and onward through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline rose 12 percent year-on-year in the first half of 2025. While still modest compared to CPC, the increase signals momentum behind the Middle Corridor. 

Bottom line: with Europe closed to Russian fuels, U.S. tariff pressure on buyers of Russian oil, and recurring outages inside Russia, the returns on refining upgrades and Middle Corridor fixes promise appealing returns. The region won’t match Russia’s scale, but targeted investment now can improve reliability, secure new long-term buyers for crude and refined products, and convert Russian volatility into a pricing premium for dependable Central Asian supply.