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what russia’s wagner group insurgence means for the caspian region

What Russia’s Wagner Group Insurgence Means for the Caspian Region

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Author: Toghrul Ali

06/30/2023

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Between June 23-24, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin’s former chef and the head of the private mercenary company Wagner Group, orchestrated an uprising and marched his mercenaries toward Moscow. Prigozhin demanded the removal of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, accusing him of undermining Wagner's operations and embezzling military resources allocated to Russia's engagement in the Ukrainian conflict. However, Prigozhin halted the rebellion following the Kremlin's assurance of amnesty and his relocation to Belarus. Prigozhin’s Wagner insurgency exposed the fragility of the interconnections within Putin's administration, including the internal cohesion of the state security apparatus and exposing Russia's military and political stances vis-à-vis the ongoing Ukrainian conflict.

What may have appeared as an armed rebellion by a private military company to topple the country's military leadership ended up falling short, resulting in the exile of Prigozhin to the territories of Belarus. While many speculations can be made regarding the motives and expected outcomes of the Wagner group’s insurgency, these recent developments laid bare Russia’s vulnerabilities, not only on the domestic front but also as a waning regional power. The Wagner insurgency, led by Prigozhin, could have far-reaching ramifications across the Caspian region, as illustrated by responses from Russia's neighboring states amid the unfolding crisis. 

While the private military company was marching towards Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin reached out to counterparts in Central Asia and South Caucasus to restrain growing uncertainties caused by the ongoing rebellion led by the Wagner mercenary group. During his phone call with Putin on June 24, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stated that the ongoing events were considered “internal affairs” of Russia, suggesting Kazakhstan’s unwillingness to assist Russia in quashing the insurgency. Tokayev further stressed that upholding the constitutional order and the rule of law is crucial for maintaining law and order. When Kazakhstan faced similar disorder during the January 2022 unrest, Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) forces, at the request of President Tokayev, entered Kazakhstan to put down the unrest. With the Wagner group posing a similar risk to Putin’s regime this time around, Tokayev refrained from involving himself in Russia's domestic politics.

Similar caution characterized leaders' responses across the Caspian region in the face of the unfolding events. Putin held phone calls with the President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and the Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, informing them about the unfolding situation in Russia. As tensions rose, the foreign ministries of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan advised their citizens against traveling to Russian regions with a border with Ukraine. In a phone call with his counterpart Putin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed his country’s willingness to assist in finding a "peaceful solution" to the Wagnerite’s armed uprising in Russia. However, overall, publicly, officials throughout Central Asia and the South Caucasus have opted to refrain from public commentary on the events unfolding in Russia. Following the Wagner insurgency, Russia, under Putin's leadership, finds itself in a weakened state, revealing the fragility of its political system. Consequently, neighboring states in the Caspian region increasingly recognize the pitfalls of overreliance on Russia's regional influence. As Putin's regime experiences continue to decline, the region may discover new opportunities emerging from this erosion of power.

The long-term consequences of the Wagner group’s attempted insurgency remain uncertain. However, one potential outcome of Russia’s waning influence in the Caspian region could be growth in economic and political relations between the region and China. In May, during the China-Central Asia Summit, China unveiled its “grandiose plan” for Central Asia while concurrently presenting an alluring alternative to Russia. As Russia sabotages its international reputation, presenting itself as an unreliable and unstable partner, the Caspian Region may find stability in its alternative partners, China and the West. With Russia’s decline, an opportunity has been revealed for Western actors, namely the United States and the European Union, to step up their engagements with the region.

Another likely outcome of Russia’s waning influence would be increased regional cooperation. Among the many significant geopolitical consequences of Russia’s war on Ukraine has been the boost in regional integration along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor. As the shortest pathway connecting Europe and Asia, the Trans-Caspian Corridor allows Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan to bypass their traditional, Russia-oriented export routes for natural gas and crude oil, as well as to diversify their supply chains by introducing new land freight lines. In this line, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have launched a new initiative to alleviate bottlenecks throughout the Middle Corridor. On June 22, during Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov’s visit to Baku, the three countries came to an agreement to establish a jointly run logistics company. The creation of an Azerbaijan-Georgian-Kazakh logistics company is expected to expedite the cargo processing time across multiple borders, ultimately making the Middle Corridor more cost-effective and faster compared to the Northern Corridor that runs through Russia. 

It can be argued that Russia’s lack of success in the war with Ukraine has already sparked uncertainties in the Caspian region regarding its military prowess and reliability as an ally. The recent, albeit short-lived, Wagner insurgency further laid bare the vulnerabilities inherent in Putin's regime, particularly concerning the internal cohesion of the state security apparatus. The so-called "march for justice" undertaken by the Wagner group effectively dismantled the notion of Putin's leadership being impervious to internal challenges, shattering the fallacy that his authority is immune to contestation from within. The cautious stance adopted by leaders in Central Asia and the South Caucasus region during the Wagner events can be attributed to a reassessment undertaken by certain countries as they grapple with the risks associated with maintaining overly close ties to Russia and harbor concerns over its reliability as an ally.

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