Following through on Uzbekistani officials’ earlier promises to sign a preferential trade agreement with Afghanistan, Tashkent and Kabul signed two monumental trade deals in June of this year: a Preferential Trade Agreement and a Joint Uzbekistan-Afghanistan Action Plan. These agreements aim to enhance Uzbekistan-Afghanistan bilateral trade through the reduction of tariff barriers and the establishment of new avenues of job creation, as well as strengthen cooperation in the trade, logistics, agriculture, industrial, and capacity-building sectors. 

At a glance, the signing of these agreements appears to be yet another expression of Tashkent’s long-observed willingness to engage economically with its presently cash-strapped but resource-rich neighbor that is increasingly recognized as a strategically important transit country. What is interesting, however, is that a surface-level perusal of the types of Afghan development projects and industries that both Tashkent, and/or Uzbekistani investors have already invested in or have recently indicated interest in securing a deal on, bear a striking resemblance to the very investments and programs that Beijing historically made in Uzbekistan. This uncanny similitude spanning across the realms of infrastructure development, energy production, mineral resource extraction, and other non-infrastructure-related private-sector endeavors suggests that Tashkent might be quietly attempting to replicate elements of Beijing’s previous investment playbook for its own future benefit in Afghanistan. 

While Uzbekistan has not given any public indication that its historical investments within Afghanistan and more recent investment pledges are part of an explicit strategy to emulate Beijing’s successful investments in its own borders, the resemblance is undoubtedly uncanny. It would be inappropriate, however, to assume that the Uzbekistani government and/or members of its business elite are solely taking a a page out of Beijing’s investment playbook. These shared investments – which could be the coincidental products of Uzbekistani and Chinese business elites’ organic independent decision-making – should raise observers’ eyebrows, nonetheless. However, confirmation that Tashkent is intentionally encouraging Uzbekistani investors’ recent ventures and investment pledges as part of a wider strategy to emulate China’s blueprint could hint that these industries are economic sectors that Tashkent seeks to diversify as a means of mitigating its dependency on Beijing, especially should further research reveal that Chinese corporations hold a significant stake in these industries in Uzbekistan.

Take transport, water, and energy transit infrastructure. The Kamchiq Rail Tunnel, built 2013-2016, is one section of the Angren-Pap rail line running throughout eastern Uzbekistan partially financed by the Export-Import Bank of China (Eximbank). In the years following, since at least 2017, Tashkent has pledged financial support for and actively proposed the construction of railway lines in Afghanistan. More recently, Uzbekistan agreed with Taliban officials to construct a railway between the Afghan cities of Khairaton and Herat in February of this year. 

Then there is the topic of irrigation infrastructure. After China’s Eximbank agreed to provide Uzbekistan with $220 million to assist Uzbekistan in reconstructing its water irrigation systems, officials from Tashkent indicated that Uzbekistani investors were interested in working with Afghanistan to improve the country’s irrigation system months later in April 2025. 

Finally, concerning energy-transit projects, such as pipelines, Uzbekistani officials recently reiterated their support for the Ashgabat-led Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline project, a monumental infrastructure project that has languished for decades due to lack of regional interest and willingness to pay for it. In Afghanistan as of January 2025 it is still in early stages of construction, and Tashkent might be ready to provide financial or manpower support. If Uzbekistan follows through on its promises, support would echo years of Chinese support for the construction of energy pipelines throughout Central Asia as well as Beijing’s plan to resume the construction of a pipeline that would run through Uzbekistan. Overall, regional energy pipeline, water irrigation, and transport infrastructure development are shared investment interests between the two capitals. 

From natural gas to waste-to-energy initiatives, so, too, does Uzbekistan appear as eager to invest in the Afghaniistan electricity production sector as Beijing has been in investing in Uzbekistan’s domestic energy production industry. In October 2024, for instance, reports emerged that Afghanistan officials had agreed on a 10-year contract worth $1 billion with an unnamed Uzbekistani company for access to Afghanistan’s Tuti Maidan gas field. This development bears a strong resemblance to the China National Petroleum Corporation’s investment into the acquisition of four Uzbekistani natural gas fields. Yet another shared interest, waste-to-energy projects, shows Chinese 2024 factory investments in Uzbekistan mirrored by Tashkent later that year through a $1.3 billion investment in waste-to-energy projects in Afghanistan. 

Mineral resource extraction and production projects relating to coal, copper, and iron also appear to be a priority for Tashkent after experiencing years of similar Chinese investments within its borders. In June 2024, for example, Afghanistan officials claimed that Uzbekistani investors had expressed their interest in investing in coal mining throughout the country, a focus undoubtedly sharing a likeness to Chinese firms’ previous investments in Uzbekistan’s coal-mining facilities, 2013-2016. Next, turn to iron. Just one month after reports emerged that China’s Limaomaoli Metal Company had begun construction of an Uzbekistan-based iron-ore mining complex, Tashkent and Kabul signed a deal pertaining to the latter’s extraction of iron-ore deposits. In keeping with this pattern, Uzbekistan deftly secured a copper deposit development agreement with Afghanistan only months after China’s Chinese Mining Energy Group and Uzbekistan’s President Mirziyoyev had met to discuss the former’s copper ore investment in Uzbekistan.  

Last but not least, Uzbekistan’s potential investments in Afghanistan include non-infrastructure-related investment deals in Kabul’s textile, cement, pharmaceutical, and chemical fertilizer production sectors – areas that the casual observer might not immediately associate with being of interest to Tashkent but are also sectors of previous Chinese investment. Look no further than Uzbekistani investors’ expressed interest in investing within Afghanistan’s textile industry that echo Beijing’s involvement in Uzbekistan’s own textile sector, a presence that was reportedly increasing as of 2018. Further, throughout the first few months of 2025, numerous sources claimed that Uzbekistani officials and/or investors were eyeing investing in Afghani pharmaceutical development projects, cement plants, and chemical-fertilizer production. These potential ventures are reminiscent of China’s own investments in Uzbekistan’s pharmaceutical, cement, and chemical-fertilizer industries within the last decade. 

If Uzbekistan’s leadership is steering investment toward the rather maximalist end of this spectrum, Tashkent might believe that framing its infrastructure-oriented and private-sector investments in Afghanistan, a country historically plagued with economic fragility and violent extremism, ostensibly as a mission to “stabilize Afghanistan,” as yielding numerous benefits. First, this message, which permeates its rhetoric regarding the matter, serves to elevate Uzbekistan’s status as a promoter of Central Asia’s regional security and connectivity. Second, it conveniently provides the political cover necessary to pursue this economic diversification, even while enabling Tashkent to assuage domestic concerns about of China’s economic presence,  continues to benefit from Beijing’s considerable investment in its domestic economic space, and, thus far, avoid any offense to its largest trading partner. 

Uzbekistan’s finalized investments and declarations of interest in investing into Afghanistan’s infrastructure, energy, and natural resource sectors, as well as non-infrastructure related private-sector endeavors relating to pharmaceutical products, cement, textiles, and chemical fertilizers, should nonetheless be regarded as important indicators for Western observers. The world may be witnessing an Uzbekistan deliberately attempting to replicate aspects of the Chinese investment playbook with a southern neighbor historically plagued by poverty-exacerbated violent extremism while embodying an important transit hub and emerging consumer market for Uzbekistani goods. Regardless of the intention for these investments by Tashkent and its business elites, Uzbekistan’s investments into Afghanistan as of late demonstrate Tashkent’s increasing willingness to assert itself economically within Central Asia. Additionally, these investments could help Western policymakers and investors calibrate their understanding of which industries Uzbekistan currently is more willing to open for Western collaboration.